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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LEGIS-
LATIVE IMPOSITION OF VICARIOUS PARENTAL LIABILITY
FOR DELINQUENT ACTS OF JUVENILES. In re John H., 293
Md. 295, 443 A.2d 594 (1982).
In In re John H., ' the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certi-
orari primarily to decide the constitutionality of a statute which author-
ized the imposition of vicarious liability upon parents for the willful or
malicious delinquent acts of their children. 2 The court of special ap-
peals had upheld the act's constitutionality.3 The court of appeals de-
clined to decide the constitutional question, however, because it had
not been preserved for appellate review.4 The purpose of this note,
1. 293 Md. 295, 443 A.2d 594 (1982).
2. Id at 296, 443 A.2d at 594. The current version of the law, which is codified at
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-829 (Supp. 1982), provides in full:
§ 3-829. Liability for acts of child.
(a) The court [exercising juvenile jurisdiction] may enter a judgment
of restitution against the parent of a child, or the child in any case in
which the court finds a child has committed a delinquent act and during
the commission of that delinquent act has:
(1) Stolen, damaged, or destroyed the property of another;
(2) Inflicted personal injury on another, requiring the injured per-
son to incur medical, dental, hospital, or funeral expenses.
(b) Considering the age and circumstances of a child, the court may
order the child to make restitution to the wronged party personally.
(c)(1) A judgment rendered under this section may not exceed:
(i) As to property stolen or destroyed, the lesser of the fair market
value of the property or $5,000;
(ii) As to property damaged, the lesser of the amount of damage
not to exceed the fair market value of the property damaged or $5,000;
and
(iii) As to personal injuries inflicted, the lesser of the reasonable
medical, dental, hospital, funeral, and burial expenses incurred by the
injured person as a result of the injury or $5,000.
(2) As an absolute limit against any one child or his parents, a
judgment rendered under this section may not exceed $5,000 for all acts
arising out of a single incident.
(d) A judgment of restitution against a parent may not be entered
unless the parent has been afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard
and to present appropriate evidence in his behalf. A hearing under this
section may be held as part of an adjudicatory or disposition hearing for
the child.
(e) The judgment may be enforced in the same manner as enforcing
monetary judgments.
Id
3. In re John H., 49 Md. App. 595, 433 A.2d 1239 (1981), afl'don other grounds, 293
Md. 295, 443 A.2d 594 (1982).
4. 293 Md. 295, 303, 443 A.2d 594, 598 (1982). The facts of the case disclose that a
juvenile, John H., was adjudged to be delinquent by reason of his participation in
the vandalism of two Baltimore County public schools in 1979. Subsequent to the
adjudication of delinquency the State's Attorney for Baltimore County filed peti-
tions against the parents of John H., praying that they be ordered to make restitu-
tion to the Board of Education of Baltimore County pursuant to MD. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-829 (1980) (current version codified at MD. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-829 (Supp. 1982)). The Circuit Court for Baltimore
County rendered a judgment against the parents, and they were ordered to pay
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therefore, is to examine the constitutionality of statutes which authorize
the imposition of vicarious parental liability for children's intentional
torts,5 and to predict how Maryland's highest court will rule on the
constitutionality of Maryland's statute.
At common law parents were not liable for the torts of their chil-
dren solely because of the parent-child relationship.6 According to
common law principles, in order to charge a parent with liability for
the tortious acts of his minor child "it must be shown that [the parent]
induced or approved the act, or that the child's relationship to the par-
ent at the time was that of servant or agent."7 In response to this rule,
which according to Dean Prosser has resulted in "a rather serious prob-
lem of uncompensated juvenile depredation,"8 most states have en-
acted statutes which make parents vicariously liable for the wrongful
acts of their minor children.' Most of these statutes either expressly or
through judicial interpretation predicate parental liability on the inten-
tional nature of the child's act.' 0 They do not, therefore, authorize re-
covery from parents for damage negligently inflicted. Generally some
maximum amount of liability, irrespective of the extent of the damage
inflicted, is specified.II A further condition of most of the statutes is
that before parental liability may be imposed it must be shown that the
child was residing with or under the control of the parent at the time
$10,100 restitution. On appeal, among other issues raised by the parents was the
constitutionality of section 3-829. That issue, as well as the others, was decided
against the parents and the trial court was affirmed. See In re John H., 49 Md.
App. 595, 433 A.2d 1239 (1981), affdon other rounds, 293 Md. 295, 443 A.2d 594
(1982). The court of appeals declined to decide the constitutional issue because
the parents had failed to argue the issue before the trial judge. 293 Md. 295, 303,
443 A.2d 594, 598 (1982).
In In re James D., 455 A.2d 966 (Md. 1983) the court of appeals was squarely
presented with the issue of section 3-829's constitutionality. Avoiding the issue,
the court held only that the word parent in the statute does not include the mother
and father of a child when the child is in the custody of the state at the time of the
incident for which recovery is sought. Id
5. See generally Note, Torts.- The Constitutional Validity of Parental Liability Stat-
utes, 55 MARQ. L. REV. 584 (1972); Note, A Constitutional Caveat on the Vicarious
Liability of Parents, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1321 (1972); Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 612
(1966).
6. Lanterman v. Wilson, 277 Md. 364, 368, 354 A.2d 432, 434 (1976).
7. Id Of course, liability for the acts of a child may be based on the negligence of
the parent. A parent may be negligent in entrusting to a child a dangerous instru-
ment or an object which the child has shown a tendency to misuse. W. PROSSER,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 123 (4th ed. 1971).
8. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 123 (4th ed. 1971).
9. Id See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-2-3 (Supp. 1982); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-3
(West 1968); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.09 (Page 1980).
10. See Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 612, 615 (1966). But see Turner v. Bucher, 308 So.2d 270
(La. 1975) (under Louisiana's statute making parents liable for damage caused by
their minor children, parents are liable whether or not the child acted negligently
or intentionally, even when the child is not of sufficient age to be capable of dis-
cerning the consequences of his acts. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2318 (1979)).




Parental liability statutes have been attacked as violative of due
process. The argument of parents is that to the extent the statute im-
poses liability without regard to either their participation in the illegal
conduct of their child or the nature of their parental supervision, it un-
constitutionally deprives them of property without due process.'
3
In passing upon the issue that parental liability without fault vio-
lates due process, courts are quick to point out that vicarious liability
without fault is not a new concept.' 4 Notable examples of the imposi-
tion of liability without fault include that of an employer for injuries to
employees under a workmen's compensation act,' that of a master for
the torts of his servant,' 6 and that of one who causes damage as a result
of engaging in abnormally dangerous activities.' 7 As one court stated,
"Due process does not restrict legislative imposition of liability to situa-
tions in which a defendant or his agent is at fault. Other considerations
may warrant the imposition of liability .. ."'8 Due process requires
only that a statute not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and
that the means selected bear a rational relation to the attainment of a
valid legislative purpose.' 9
Courts have identified two legislative purposes sought to be at-
tained by a parental liability statute: deterrence of juvenile delinquency
and compensation of innocent victims for the damage caused by minor
tortfeasors.20 In all except one case the existence of the parent-child
relationship was found to provide a rational basis for imposing liability
without fault upon parents.
12. Id
13. See Watson v. Gradzik, 34 Conn. Supp. 7, 373 A.2d 191 (1977); Vanthournout v.
Burge, 69 Ill. App. 3d 193, 387 N.E.2d 341 (1979); In re Sorrell, 20 Md. App. 179,
315 A.2d 110, cert. denied, 271 Md. 740 (1974); Board of Educ. v. Caffiero, 86 N.J.
308, 431 A.2d 799, appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1025 (1981); General Ins. Co. of
Am. v. Faulkner, 259 N.C. 317, 130 S.E.2d 645 (1963); Rudnay v. Corbett, 53
Ohio App. 2d 311, 374 N.E.2d 171 (1977); Kelly v. Williams, 346 S.W.2d 434
(Tex. Civ. App. 1961); Mahaney v. Hunter Enterprises, Inc., 426 P.2d 442 (Wyo.
1967).
14. Eg. In re Sorrell, 20 Md. App. 179, 315 A.2d 110, cert. denied, 271 Md. 740
(1974); General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Faulkner, 259 N.C. 317, 130 S.E.2d 645 (1963).
15. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 80 (4th ed. 1971).
16. Id § 70.
17. Id § 78.
18. Board of Educ. v. Caffiero, 86 N.J. 308, 319, 431 A.2d 799, 804, appeal dismissed,
454 U.S. 1025 (1981).
19. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Edgewood Nursing Home v. Maxwell,
282 Md. 422, 384 A.2d 748 (1978). Because no court has found that a parental
liability statute impacts upon a fundamental right or creates a suspect classifica-
tion, strict judicial scrutiny has not been applied. E.g., Watson v. Gradzik, 34
Conn. Supp. 7, 373 A.2d 191 (1977).
20. Eg., Vanthournout v. Burge, 69 Ill. App. 3d 193, 387 N.E.2d 341 (1979); General
Ins. Co. of Am. v. Faulkner, 259 N.C. 317, 130 S.E.2d 645 (1963).
21. See cases cited supra note 13; see also the statement of legislative finding and
declaration of legislative intent in W. VA. CODE § 55-7A-1 (Supp. 1982) ("[T]here
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State courts have taken divergent positions on the question of
whether the constitutionality of a parental liability statute is affected by
the absence of a limitation on the amount of liability imposed. In Gen-
eral Insurance Co. of America v. Faulkner,22 the Supreme Court of
North Carolina held that a statute rendering parents liable to the extent
of $500 for their children's malicious or willful destruction of property
was within the police power of the state and constitutional. The court
observed that the statute was "adopted not out of consideration for pro-
viding a restorative compensation for the victims of injurious or tor-
tious conduct of children, but as an aid in the control of juvenile
delinquency."23
In Corley v. Lewless, 24 however, the Supreme Court of Georgia
held unconstitutional a statute which made a parent or other person in
loco parentis liable, without monetary limitation, for the willful and
wanton torts of his minor children. After pointing out that the statute
in Faulkner contained a liability limitation of $500, and therefore au-
thorized a recovery in the nature of a penalty, the court stated that the
Georgia law "is not penal but seeks to provide compensation in full for
property damage or for personal injury. ' 25 The court then stated that
the statute imposed "vicarious tort liability solely on the basis of the
parent-child relationship," and without further analysis held that it vio-
lated due process.
26
The Supreme Court of Georgia had an opportunity to explain its
position in a 1982 case when, "[flollowing the hint laid down in Cor-
ley," 27 the Georgia General Assembly enacted a modified version of
arises or should arise out of [the parent-child] relationship, a responsibility to rec-
ompense persons injured by [the child's] acts of vandalism and willful and mali-
cious injuries to persons and property"). Contra Corley v. Lewless, 227 Ga. 745,
182 S.E.2d 766 (1971).
22. 259 N.C. 317, 130 S.E.2d 645 (1963).
23. Id at 323, 130 S.E.2d at 650. The court went on to observe that:
[The statute's] rationale apparently is that parental indifference and fail-
ure to supervise the activities of children is one of the major causes of
juvenile delinquency; that parental liability for harm done by children
will stimulate attention and supervision; and that the total effect will be a
reduction in the anti-social behavior of children.
Id.
24. 227 Ga. 745, 182 S.E.2d 766 (1971).
25. Id at 750, 182 S.E.2d at 770.
26. Id. As the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland noted, Corley created an infer-
ence "that limitations upon the amount of vicarious parental liability could affect
the constitutionality of a legislative right to impose it." In re Sorrell, 20 Md. App.
179, 187, 315 A.2d 110, 115, cert. denied, 271 Md. 740 (1974) (emphasis in origi-
nal). This inference is questionable, for if the essence of the Corley holding is that
due process is violated when parental liability is imposed solely because of the
parent-child relationship, the presence or absence of a limitation on liability
would not seem to be constitutionally significant. See Note, Torts.- The Constitu-
tional Validity of Parental Liability Statutes, 55 MARQ. L. REV. 584, 590 (1972).
27. Hayward v. Ramick, 248 Ga. 841, 843, 285 S.E.2d 697, 698 (1982).
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the law struck down in Corley. In Hayward v. Ramick 28 the Georgia
court upheld a statute which, similar to the one in Faulkner, rendered
parents liable to the extent of $500 for their children's malicious or
willful destruction of property of another.29 The court held that the
new statute was intended to aid in reducing juvenile delinquency (a
valid legislative objective), and that the means used to effect that pur-
pose (imposing parental liability) were rational.30 The court said,
"While we do not reaffirm Corley, we do hold that the legislature has
met the objections to Corley in the new statute with which we now
deal." 3
Whatever the vitality of the concept that limitations upon the
amount of vicarious parental liability affect the legislative right to im-
pose it, it is clear that statutes which seek to provide compensation in
full for damage inflicted by children have been upheld.32 In Rudnay v.
Corbett3 3 the Court of Appeals of Ohio upheld the constitutionality of
a statute which authorized any owner of property willfully damaged by
the child of another to maintain a civil action against the parents of the
child to recover compensatory damages up to $2,000.34 The court
based its holding solely on the rationale that the imposition of liability
on parents was a reasonable means to attain the valid legislative pur-
pose of compensating innocent victims of property damage. It stated
that "[W]e believe the $2,000 limit is adequate in most cases to compen-
sate injured property owners for the value of their damaged prop-
erty."35 Because its holding was based on the compensatory nature of
the law, the court found it "unnecessary to specifically analyze whether
the statute additionally serves to curb juvenile delinquency.
36
In Board of Education v. Caffiero37 the New Jersey Supreme Court
held that it is of no constitutional significance whether a parental liabil-
ity statute contains a limitation on liability. In that case the court up-
held a statute which imposes limitless vicarious liability without fault
on the parents or guardian of any public school pupil who willfully or
maliciously damages public school property.38 After holding that the
presence of the parent-child relationship establishes a rational basis for
imposing liability and is a reasonable means to accomplish the pur-
poses of deterrence and compensation, the court stated:
28. 248 Ga. 841, 285 S.E.2d 697 (1982).
29. Id. at 843, 285 S.E.2d at 699; see GA. CODE ANN. § 51-2-3 (Supp. 1982).
30. Hayward v. Ramick, 248 Ga. 841, 843, 285 S.E.2d 697, 698 (1982).
31. Id
32. E.g., Board of Educ. v. Caffiero, 86 N.J. 308, 431 A.2d 799, appeal dismissed, 454
U.S. 1025 (1981); Rudnay v. Corbett, 53 Ohio App. 2d 311, 374 N.E.2d 171 (1977).
33. 53 Ohio App. 2d 311, 374 N.E.2d 171 (1977).
34. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.09 (Page 1980).
35. Rudnay v. Corbett, 53 Ohio App. 2d 311, 317-18, 374 N.E.2d 171, 175 (1977)
(emphasis in original).
36. Id
37. 86 N.J. 308, 431 A.2d 799, appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1025 (1981).
38. Id at 321, 431 A.2d at 805; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-3 (West 1968).
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It is of little constitutional significance that the statutes upheld
• . . contained a maximum limit on liability. A fixed dollar
limit would not adequately accomplish the State's purpose of
compensation. By placing a limit on liability, the remedy be-
comes a form of civil penalty. We see no reason to believe
that the imposition of a civil penalty on parents is a constitu-
tionally permissible means of encouraging discipline, but that
vicarious liability for actual damages is not.
39
In In re John H. 40 the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, rely-
ing on its holding in In re Sorrell,4 upheld the constitutionality of
Maryland's parental liability act. Certiorari was granted by the court
of appeals to review that holding, but because the issue had not been
properly preserved the decision of the court of special appeals was af-
firmed on other grounds.4 2 The court of appeals did note, however,
that the constitutional issue was an "interesting question," to be left to
another case where the issue is squarely presented.43
The most distinctive feature of Maryland's parental liability stat-
ute is that it does not create a private cause of action.' Rather, imposi-
tion of parental liability authorized by the law is dependent upon the
presence of several factors which are not required in other parental lia-
bility statutes, namely: (1) institution by the state of a juvenile delin-
quency proceeding against the child; (2) an adjudication of
delinquency; and (3) a discretionary decision by the trial judge to im-
pose liability.45 A judgment rendered under the statute "may not ex-
ceed $5,000 for all acts arising out of a single incident."46 Furthermore,
a judgment of restitution against a parent "may not be entered unless
the parent has been afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and
to present appropriate evidence on his behalf.
47
In a 1974 case, In re Sorrell,48 the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland upheld the constitutionality of Maryland's parental liability
39. Board of Educ. v. Caffiero, 86 N.J. 308, 321, 431 A.2d 799, 805, appeal dismissed,
454 U.S. 1025 (1981). The foregoing examination of the cases in this area reveals
the truth of the statement that "Courts which have addressed the constitutionality
of parental responsibility statutes have, for various and often imprecise reasons,
upheld the validity of those statutes." Rudnay v. Corbett, 53 Ohio App. 2d 311,
316, 374 N.E.2d 171, 172 (1977).
40. 49 Md. App. 595, 433 A.2d 1239 (1981), affdon other grounds, 293 Md. 295, 443
A.2d 594 (1982).
41. 20 Md. App. 179, 315 A.2d 110, cert. denied, 271 Md. 740 (1974).
42. In re John H., 293 Md. 295, 443 A.2d 594 (1982).
43. Id at 303, 443 A.2d at 598.
44. See supra note 2 for the full text of Maryland's current parental liability statute.
45. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-829(a) (Supp. 1982). "Child" means a
person under the age of 18 years. Id § 3-801(d).
46. Id § 3-829(c)(2). The statute authorizes restitution for the fair market value of
property damage suffered or medical expenses incurred, but does not authorize
damages for pain and suffering. Id (c)(l).
47. Id § 3-829(d).
48. 20 Md. App. 179, 315 A.2d 110, cert. denied, 271 Md. 740 (1974).
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statute. A notable difference between the 1974 and current version of
the law is that the former had a $1,000 limit on liability. 9 In Sorrell
the court reviewed the cases passing on the constitutional issue and
identified both deterrence of delinquency and compensation of victims
as possible legislative purposes for the law. The court did not, how-
ever, categorically hold that the Maryland law was based on either or
both of those purposes. Rather, the court concluded: "The legislative
determination here demonstrates a legitimate State interest in a matter
affecting the general welfare. The remedy selected for the protection
and promotion of that determination has not been shown to be arbi-
trary, oppressive or unreasonable."50
While the court appeared to question the inference suggested in
Corley v. Lewless,5 1 because of the $1,000 limitation on liability con-
tained in Maryland's statute, it did not have to decide whether such
limitations could affect the statute's validity. 2 The court did, however,
quote at length from opinions demonstrating a broad view of the police
power, thus giving an indication that it would have upheld the law
even if there was no limitation on liability present.53 The Sorrell court
made no mention of the fact that restitution may only be awarded if a
state's attorney has brought a juvenile cause against the child, thus im-
plicitly finding no constitutional significance in this fact.
Because of the comparatively high $5,000 limitation on liability
contained in the current law, it appears that the legislature intended for
most victims to have the benefit of restitution in full for expenses in-
curred as a result of juvenile delinquency. It also understood, however,
that parental behavior and financial means are relevant to the determi-
nation of how much restitution should be imposed. Therefore, the
General Assembly provided parents an opportunity to speak in their
own behalf, and rested the final decision of whether to impose parental
49. Compare MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-829(c)(2) (Supp. 1982) with MD.
CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-839(c) (1974).
50. In re Sorrell, 20 Md. App. 179, 189, 315 A.2d l10, 116, cert. denied, 271 Md. 740
(1974).
51. 227 Ga. 745, 182 S.E.2d 766 (1971).
52. See supra note 26.
53. In re Sorrell, 20 Md. App. 179, 187-89, 315 A.2d 110, 115-16, cert. denied, 271 Md.
740 (1974). For example, the court quoted from Allied Am. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v.
Commissioner, 219 Md. 607, 150 A.2d 421 (1959), where it was said:
Essentially the police power of a state is no more than the power to gov-
ern. . . .The power justifies regulations designed to promote the pub-
lic convenience or the general prosperity, as well as those to promote
public safety, health and morals, since it extends to the satisfying of great
public needs and the promotion of the general welfare.
Id at 616, 150 A.2d at 427 (citations omitted). The court also quoted from A & H
Transp., Inc. v. Mayor and City Council, 249 Md. 518, 240 A.2d 601 (1968), where
it was said: "It has long been settled in Maryland that, in the exercise of its police
power, the legislature has a broad discretion in determining what the public wel-
fare requires and what remedies are appropriate for the protection and promotion
of that determination." Id at 528, 240 A.2d at 606.
19821 In re John H.
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liability within the discretion of the trial judge. 4 In light of present
notions of due process, which have little changed since Sorrell was de-
cided, it is doubtful that the court of appeals would find Maryland's
parental liability statute constitutionally infirm.
Indeed, the parent's status as legal guardian of the child provides a
legitimate basis for the imposition of liability.5 The status of legal
guardian connotes a spectrum of rights and duties; foremost among
these are the duty to protect the child and to do whatever may be neces-
sary for his welfare, and the right to direct the child's activities and
make decisions regarding his care, control, education, health and reli-
gion. 6 Granting that in some cases even the highest level of parental
diligence may not prevent juvenile delinquency, the Constitution does
not prohibit a legislative determination that, along with the right to
bear and raise children, parents should be subject to the duty of insur-
ing that the rights of other people are protected.
Burton H Levin
54. See MD. CTS. AND JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-829(a), (d) (Supp. 1982). Al-
though the statute authorizes a judgment of restitution against "the parent of a
child," id (a), the word parent is not defined. In Board of Educ. v. Caffiero, 86
N.J. 308, 431 A.2d 799, appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1025 (1981), the statute author-
ized liability against "the parents or guardian of any pupil who shall injure any
school property .. " In defining the scope of the law, the court said:
[B]ecause one purpose of the statute is to aid the disciplining of pupils,
we believe that the words "parents or guardian" were intended to refer
only to the person or persons who are responsible for a child. . . . The
statute applies only to persons who have legal custody and control of a
child and therefore can be charged on that basis with responsibility for
the child's conduct.
Id at 316, 431 A.2d at 803. Placing liability upon a parent who no longer has
guardianship rights in a juvenile would be irrational and oppressive. Therefore,
"parent" in the Maryland law should be construed to be limited to parents
charged with legal responsibility for the child. Indeed, in In re James D., 455
A.2d 966 (Md. 1983), the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the word parent
in the statute does not include the mother and father of a child when the child is
in the custody of the State at the time of the incident for which recovery is sought.
Because the Maryland law does not mention guardians or other persons in loco
parentis it is doubtful that it could be applied to them. According to an opinion of
the Attorney General of Maryland, the General Assembly did not intend for the
predecessor of MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-829 (Supp. 1982) to apply
to foster parents. 59 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 356 (1974).
55. MD. CODE ANN. art. 72A, § 1 (1978) provides: "The father and mother are the
joint natural guardians of their child under eighteen years of age and are jointly
and severally charged with its support, care, nurture, welfare and education." Id
56. See Palmer v. State, 223 Md. 341, 164 A.2d 467 (1960).
